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Abstract 
This paper documents the diverse financial structures – including capital structures and funding 
strategies – of Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs) and offers an analysis of RFAs’ lending capacity 
from a statutory, accounting and credit rating perspective. Using credit rating agencies’ 
methodologies, the paper presents the dynamic relationship between RFAs’ financial structures, the 
support from their member states and their resulting creditworthiness. A stylized model is developed 
to demonstrate how the relative size of an institution’s paid-in compared with its callable capital, 
together with its member states’ support, could have an impact on the overall credit rating and lending 
capacity of an RFA. This paper contributes to the growing policy discussions on the heterogeneity of 
RFAs and their rising importance in the Global Financial Safety Net. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent euro area debt crisis have highlighted once again the 
importance to secure sufficient liquidity resources for sovereign states under financial strains. In view 
of enhancing the emergency liquidity supply in the International Monetary System, a large number of 
countries, in particular the Group of Twenty major economies (G20), have acted quickly and proposed 
a series of reforms at the height of the crises. As Cheng (2016) documents, the G20 countries 
successfully pushed for replenishing financial resources and renewing instruments for emergency 
liquidity provision at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In addition, a 
number of new Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs) were also created and a few other existing 
RFAs were further strengthened institutionally and financially. Therefore, the overall lending capacity 
of the Global Financial Safety Net has been very much reinforced. For instance, besides the surge in 
reserve accumulation from 2007 to end 2016 (which reached $10,715 billion, above 8 trillion SDR as 
indicated in Figure 1), the sum of the three other layers – bilateral swap arrangements (BSA), resources 
available from RFAs and the IMF – rose from merely $400 billion to $3,800 billion during the same 
period.  
Figure 1 Evolution of the multi-layered GFSN 
Source: IMF (2016), p.9. 
Among the different layers of the safety net, RFAs remain the least known. They only entered the 
policy debate in recent years, thanks to RFAs’ own effort (AMRO, ESM, and FLAR, 2017) and the IMF’s 
works (IMF (2013), IMF (2016), and IMF (2017)). It is important to highlight that RFAs are 
heterogeneous, mainly because of their history, origin and types of crises they are mandated to deal 
with. The diversity of RFAs is a key feature that policy discussions have been emphasising, especially 
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in view of finding appropriate modalities for enhanced cooperation between the IMF and RFAs, which 
must fully recognise and embody this heterogeneity.  
Based on recent financial assistance programmes, Figure 2 illustrates the heterogeneity of RFAs in a 
number of dimensions. Mandated to deal with different shocks, RFAs are equipped with different 
instruments (e.g., swap lines or loans), provide assistance in domestic or foreign currency, have 
different funding sources (e.g., self-funded or market-funded) and they also design programmes 
differently (e.g., whether with conditionality or in co-financing with the IMF).  
Figure 2 The diversity of RFAs through the prism of recent operations 
 
Source: Own calculations. NB: 64 total programmes since 2007. 
Our current study aims to document the heterogeneity among RFAs and focuses on their capital 
structure and funding strategies, which are also closely related with the overall size of an RFA’s lending 
capacity. The capital structure and any other funding structure of an RFA are in fact crucial to ensure 
sustained funding for its main activity, i.e., to provide crisis liquidity with favourable financial 
conditions to a member state under financial strains. In addition, market participants – particularly 
credit rating agencies – also carefully examine RFAs’ financial structures especially when they raise 
funds by issuing securities.  
Our paper provides three sets of exercises. First, we document the maximum lending capacity from 
both a statutory and accounting perspective. A scrutiny of the founding legal texts identifies whether 
there are legal caps on the maximum lending capacity in a given RFA while the accounting analysis can 
provide a picture of the actual use of RFAs’ resources and their remaining capacity to provide 
assistance give a given point in time. Our approach, therefore, contributes to the research efforts to 
estimate the size of the emergency liquidity available in the Global Financial Safety Net. For instance, 
Scheubel and Stracca (2016) estimate the size of RFAs by the disbursed loans from RFAs in the past as 
a continuous variable or the RFA membership as a dummy variable. The first variable only indicates 
the actual use of RFAs’ resources and fails to capture the potential size of RFAs’ financing; neither does 
the second dummy variable. Our second exercise, which analyses RFAs’ actual lending capacities and 
creditworthiness using the prevailing methodologies used by credit rating agencies to rate 
39
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supranational entities, allows us to understand RFAs’ potential lending capacity from a market 
perspective. This exercise illustrates the interdependence between an RFA’s creditworthiness and its 
leverage to tap financial markets when it is allowed. Finally, using a stylised model, we will shed light 
on possible interactions between a RFA’s capital structure (i.e., the share of the paid-in and callable 
capital or guarantees), shareholder strength and the RFA’s own creditworthiness and lending capacity. 
This provides some insight on key institutional and governance aspects of these regional institutions. 
Our paper is related to a growing academic literature on the evolution, adequacy and composition of 
the GFSN.1 Cheng (2016) builds on the G20 official documents to trace the G20 reform proposals 
related to strengthening of the GFSN from 2009 to 2014. He finds that reforms aimed at enhancing 
financial resources and renewing instruments for emergency liquidity provision in the GFSN were 
substantially implemented. However, institutional reforms concerning the governing structure of 
International Financial Institutions were delayed. Scheubel and Stracca (2016) offer a comprehensive 
reading of the rationale, the actual use and the potential adequacy of the GFSN. Based on a novel 
database the authors have constructed, they also present some interesting stylised facts about the 
evolution of the GFSN. As the global layer of protection in the GFSN, the IMF has also written a series 
of policy papers on the adequacy of resources available in the system. IMF (2016) assesses the 
different layers of the safety net using a scorecard of five dimensions: predictability, speed of 
activation, reliability, financial and political cost and incentives for policy correction. The paper 
concludes that most GFSN elements are very costly, either financially or politically. Inadequate 
predictability of many GFSN resources, together with the lack of reliable coverage for the full duration 
of shocks, have led to an over reliance on foreign exchange reserves. IMF (2017) proposes principles 
and modalities to guide the collaboration between the IMF and RFAs.  
There have also been a few authors who concentrate their analysis on the regional line of defence, 
i.e., RFAs. Hill and Menon (2012) and Rhee et al. (2013) are among the first to have discussed the set-
up of the Asian and European RFAs as a response to the Asian and the Global Financial Crises 
respectively. They also examine the relationships between global and regional financial safety nets, 
and uncover the potential tensions and operational challenges associated with the involvement of 
several institutional players for the International Monetary System. Eichengreen (2010) and 
Eichengreen (2012) provide an assessment of the size of RFAs, in comparison with the IMF’s lending 
capacity and the potential need to prevent balance-of-payment difficulties. Eichengreen (2010) argues 
that most of RFAs are small and lack independent and proper surveillance capacities. Cheng et al. 
(2018) present a dataset on RFA assistance events and shed light on the complementarity between 
the IMF’s and RFAs’ financing.  
In what will follow, Section 2 classifies existing RFAs based on their funding strategies and provides an 
analysis of their lending capacity from both a legal and an accounting perspective. Section 3 examines 
the potential size and the creditworthiness of the selected RFAs. This section also presents a stylised 
model to illustrate the dynamic relationship between an RFA’s financial structure, shareholder 
strength, and its own credit strength. Section 4 concludes.  
                                                          
1 The short literature review focuses on the regional layer of the safety net. The literature on other layers, i.e., foreign 
reserves and bilateral swap lines is extensive. This is mainly because foreign reserves and swap lines have long been stand-
alone buffer stocks against foreign-currency liquidity shocks. More on foreign reserves and bilateral swap lines, please refer 
to Aizenman and Lee (2007), Obstfeld (2009), IMF (2013), and Bussière et al. (2015), to name a few. 
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2 RFAS’ DIVERSE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES AND LENDING CAPACITY 
In this section, we present the different mechanisms through which RFAs secure funds for their crisis 
resolution activities. We will use the term “capital structure” loosely, to designate any form of financial 
contributions from an RFA’s member states, equivalent to the notion of equity. The term “funding 
strategy” will refer to market financing operations of some RFAs, which includes issuing securities or 
receiving deposits. The term “financial structure” will be used to designate both capital structures and 
funding strategies.  
2.1 Classification of RFAs’ funding strategy 
Based on where an RFA gets resources to finance its financial assistance programmes, we can broadly 
divide RFAs into three categories, as shown in Figure 3. There is a group of RFAs – exclusively in Europe 
– which are active issuers of securities and only use market funding for liquidity provision. On the 
opposite side of the spectrum, some RFAs can only rely on member states’ financial commitments and 
contributions. Finally, there are RFAs that fall in between these two extreme cases. They mainly use 
members’ contributions but can also raise funds from other market-based channels. We will examine 
these three types of funding strategies in turn. For comparative purposes, we also include the IMF2 as 
a reference.  
Figure 3 Typology of RFAs by Financing Strategy 
  
NB: European Stability Mechanism (ESM), European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), European Union 
Balance of Payments Facility (EU BoP), Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD), Fondo Latinoamericano de 
Reservas (FLAR), BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (BRICS CRA), Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM), North American Financial Arrangement 
(NAFA). 
Source: Own depiction. 
                                                          
2 As the IMF’s General Department and Concessional Lending and Debt Relief Trusts function differently, we will examine 
both accounts when looking at the IMF.  
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2.1.1 Active market issuers 
The first group of RFAs tap financial markets by issuing bills and bonds and only channel market 
financing to their assistance programmes. In a sense, they serve as an intermediary between financial 
markets and any requesting member states that need affordable financing. The capacity of this group 
of RFAs to leverage on financial markets comes from the contributions of their member states, either 
in the form of capital contributions (paid-in or callable) or guarantees. All the crisis resolution 
mechanisms in Europe fall into this category.  
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is the permanent crisis resolution mechanism for euro area 
countries. The ESM and its predecessor the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) have a fully-
fledged funding team and issue debt securities that fall under the category of Sovereign, 
Supranational, Agency (SSA) issuance. The ESM has built a complete yield curve ranging from 1 to 45 
years. The market financing allows the ESM/EFSF to leverage on market financing in order to provide 
financial assistance, which largely exceeds the normal and exceptional access limit of IMF 
programmes. Based on the ESM’s capital structure and the EFSF’s guarantee scheme, both institutions 
benefit from very high rating assessments by rating agencies and can thus tap financial markets at the 
most favourable rates. The leverage ratio – defined as the ratio between paid-in capital and the 
outstanding amount of ESM issuances (Article 41 of the ESM Treaty) – is set at a minimum 15%. ESM 
securities are also classified as high-quality liquid assets by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision.   
The European Commission also administers two support arrangements that preceded and now 
complement the euro area crisis resolution mechanisms: European Union Balance of Payment Facility 
(EU BoP) and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM).3 To finance any programmes, 
the European Commission is empowered by the EU Treaty to borrow from the international capital 
markets, on behalf of the European Union. Backed by the EU budget which in turn is backed by the 
highly rated member states and their strong commitment to ensure the EU’s sound finances, the 
Commission’s bond issuances benefit from AAA-rates which it then passes on to the beneficiary 
member states. The EU BoP facility covers EU member states not having accepted the euro as their 
currency and can borrow up to €50 billion for financial assistance programmes. The EFSM, which is 
supposed to be functional only in exceptional circumstances for euro area countries after the creation 
of the ESM, covers all the 28 EU member states and has a lending capacity of €60 billion. In recent 
years, the EU BoP raised funds to support Hungary, Latvia, and Romania while the EFSM taped markets 
to assist Ireland (€22.5 billion in 2010), Portugal (€24.3 billion in 2011) and Greece4 (€7.16 billion in 
2015).  
2.1.2 RFAs with member states’ contributions only 
A number of RFAs can only use member states’ financial contributions for crisis liquidity provision. 
This is the case for RFAs operating with swap or credit lines, such as the BRICS Contingent Reserve 
                                                          
3 Please note that the European Commission has another assistance programme, named Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA), 
which is dedicated to non-EU partner countries. It covers non-EU partner countries defined in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy functions. As the arrangement is defined on a case-by-case basis and it provides assistance beyond a strictly “regional” 
scope, we decide not to include it in the current analysis. For record, the MFA provided assistance to Armenia, Georgia, 
Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, Moldova, Tunisia, and Ukraine in recent years. 
4 This EFSM loan was of an exceptional nature, to provide a short-term financing to Greece to bridge the gap and the financing 
need of the country when it was transiting from an EFSF programme (the 2nd Greek programme) to an ESM programme (the 
3rd Greek programme).   
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Arrangement (BRICS CRA), the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) and the North 
American Financial Arrangement (NAFA). The Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD) 
also only channels its members’ contributions to different programmes. One crucial difference 
between the RFAs operating with swap lines and the EFSD is that members’ contributions take the 
form of a commitment for the former but they are actually paid in for the EFSD.   
CMIM has a total financial commitment of $240 billion from 14 members (ASEAN+3 countries plus 
Hong Kong). The contribution commitment to the CMIM does not involve an outright transfer of the 
committed amount but is instead in the form of a commitment letter. In case of an emergency, the 
central banks/monetary authorities of participating countries in the CMIM issue a promissory note in 
the amount equivalent to their committed contribution. Under this arrangement, the management 
and custody of committed reserves remain with the central banks until a swap request is approved. 
In case of a swap request, the amount to be provided by each CMIM party will only be proportionate 
to its respective contribution to the CMIM. BRICS CRA functions in a similar way as CMIM among its 
five founding members (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The initial total committed 
resources of the BRICS CRA – in the form of currency swaps – were set at $100 billion. 
NAFA is a financial adjunct to the North American Free Trade Agreement. It encompasses three 
existing bilateral swap agreements between the United States, Canada and Mexico.5 Compared with 
other RFAs, it is a much less structured form of regional mutual assistance.  
EFSD has a total subscribed capital of $8.153 billion from six member states, of which $3.059 billion is 
paid in. The decision to channel market financing depends very much on the instrument that EFSD 
uses to provide financing to a requesting member state. EFSD would use member states’ contributions 
to provide “Financial Credits” used to support members’ national budgets and the balance of 
payments. EFSD, mostly backed by its two biggest shareholders (Russia and Kazakhstan), could also 
play the role of a financial intermediary by raising funds in financial markets when “Investment Loans” 
are provided.  
As a reference point, the IMF is not allowed to borrow from the market. Quotas, namely member 
states’ contributions, form the first line of resources for the IMF to provide financial assistance. In 
exceptional cases, such as at the height of the Global Financial Crisis, the IMF can also borrow from its 
member states via multilateral borrowing arrangements (second line of defence) or bilateral 
borrowing arrangements (third line of defence).  
  
2.1.3 RFAs that can use both market financing and member states’ contributions 
Finally, the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) and the Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas (FLAR) fall in 
between the two extreme cases presented above. These RFAs mainly rely on member states’ 
contributions for liquidity provision, but can also use other market-based instruments to raise funds, 
such as issuing securities or receiving deposits from member states’ central banks or other financial 
                                                          
5 As the NAFA is composed of purely bilateral swap lines, the amount of each line is subject to changes. The latest data 
available shows a US-Mexico facility of $6 billion, a Canada-Mexico swap of CAN$1 billion and the swap agreement between 
the US Federal Reserve and Bank of Canada of $2 billion (Henning R. C., 2002).  
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institutions. The decision which financial resources will be used depends mainly on the size of the 
financial assistance and/or the type of assistance instruments requested. 
The members of the AMF include 22 countries of the Arab League. AMF has a total authorised capital 
of 1200 million Arab dinar units of account (AAD) and a total subscribed capital of AAD 900 million 
Arab dinar units of account (equivalent to $3.6 billion) as of end 2017. The subscribed capital is split 
between paid-in and callable capital from its members. The Article 18 of the Articles of Agreement of 
the AMF stipulates that the maximum amount of indebtedness of the AMF, including the amounts 
borrowed and the guarantees issued, is required not to exceed 200% of the total of the authorised 
capital and the general reserve.6 Therefore, the maximum lending capacity of the AMF is legally 
capped at approximately $12bn according to the financial statement data at end 2016.  
FLAR saw its overall size of resources increase in 2012 and after the accession of Paraguay on 30 
October 2014. The participation of Paraguay raised the total subscribed capital to $3.93 billion of 
which $2.86 billion is paid in as of December 2016. FLAR’s financial structure is a mixture of a “deposit 
bank” and a “fund”. The majority of its liabilities are term deposits by central banks and other official 
financial institutions of Latin American countries that may or may not be a member of FLAR. Deposits 
have an average maturity of less than one month.  FLAR can also raise short-term funding from 
markets by issuing medium-term notes. However, in recent years, FLAR did not have outstanding debt 
nor have plans to issue new debt. FLAR issued its first note in 2003 for $105 million with a 3-year tenor 
and issued another $250 million floating rate note with a 5-year tenor in 2006. Both notes were fully 
repaid, explaining the absence of debt instruments in its current balance sheet (see Figure 4). In 
general, the institution’s leverage policy requires that maximum indebtedness does not exceed 65% 
of its paid-in capital.  
For further information, the Annex provides a visual representation of RFAs’ financial structures.  
 
2.2 Relating RFAs’ financial structures to their lending capacity 
An RFA’s lending capacity and its funding strategy are the two sides of the same coin, the lending 
capacity of a RFA is conditional either on the institution’s capacity to borrow from financial markets 
or on the capital, thus equity, that member states setting up the institution are committed to put in. 
In this section, we explore the lending capacity of RFAs by looking at both their founding legal 
documents and recent balance sheets. A reading of RFAs’ founding documents will document any legal 
constraints on the maximum of member states’ contribution or lending capacity of an RFA. On the 
other hand, a reading of RFAs’ financial statements will inform about the size of RFAs’ on-going 
programmes relative to the overall size of their balance sheets.  
                                                          
6 The general reserve balance reached AAD 214.167 million at the end of 2016 and AAD 191.854 million at the end of 2015 
(AMF, 2016). Please note that at the AMF, the general reserve balance is only part of its total reserves, which also include 
contingency reserve and the reserve for revaluation at fair value for investments classified as available for sale. 
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2.2.1 RFAs’ lending capacity: a statutory approach 
To understand the maximum lending volume of an RFA, one can first refer to the founding legal 
documents of different RFAs, i.e., the treaty or intergovernmental agreement establishing the 
institution, by-laws, etc. 
The European RFAs have each a clearly and legally defined maximum lending volume. The Treaty 
establishing the ESM stipulates that “the initial maximum lending volume of the ESM is set at EUR 500 
000 million, including the outstanding EFSF stability support (preamble (6)).”  The article 40 of the ESM 
Treaty further confirms that member states’ payment of the initial paid-in capital is “to maintain a 
minimum 15% ratio between paid-in capital and the outstanding amount of ESM issuances and 
guarantee a minimum combined lending capacity of the ESM and of the EFSF of EUR 500 000 
(paragraph 2, article 41).” Similarly, the EFSM and the EU BoP Facility have a legally fixed cap, at €60 
billion and €50 billion respectively. As mentioned earlier, AMF and FLAR have also a legally defined 
maximum lending capacity relative to the leverage ratio.  
For other RFAs, a legally defined concept of the maximum lending volume does not exist, but two 
other concepts can help us grasp their maximum lending capacity: (1) total subscribed capital or 
contributions from member states and (2) maximum access rights of individual member states. The 
total subscribed capital is the total capital the members of an RFA agreed to contribute. In the absence 
of market-based financing, this can be seen as the maximum liability of an RFA to support regional 
stability. In some RFAs, maximum access rights for each member state are also defined, as one can 
see in Annex 2. This concept is in most cases defined as a multiplier of each member country’s financial 
contribution. The sum of all members’ maximum access rights gives an idea about the maximum 
lending capacity of a RFA. However, this metric gives an upward bias, as it is reasonable to assume 
that not all members of a RFA are expected to draw simultaneously.  
Table 1 summaries the legally defined maximum lending capacity, the subscribed capital or 
commitment, and the sum of member states’ maximum access rights from different RFAs when they 
are available. To facilitate cross-RFA comparison and the subsequent discussions on RFAs’ lending 
capacity, we define a “pseudo statutory lending capacity” to capture the available information as 
follows. It captures the legally defined maximum lending volume wherever possible (i.e., AMF, FLAR 
and European RFAs). If this is not defined, and the RFA serves as a financial intermediary between 
member states and the markets, we take the maximum between its subscribed capital and the sum 
of individual countries’ maximum access rights. Finally, for those RFAs that do not have a legally 
defined maximum lending capacity nor access to financial markets, we use its subscribed capital or 
member states’ contributions as a proxy (i.e., BRICS CRA, CMIM). 
Table 1 RFAs’ lending capacity from a statutory approach (as of end 2016) 
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* EFSF ceased to provide new loans after the set-up of the ESM. EFSF’s commitments include over-guarantees of 165%. 
** AMF’s maximum lending capacity is calculated using end-2016 data on its general reserve balance as indicated in 
footnote 6. 
Source: RFAs’ legal documents and own calculation.  
2.2.2 RFAs’ lending capacity: an accounting perspective 
After a statutory reading of RFAs’ lending capacity, we now turn to an analysis of RFAs’ balance sheets, 
which will allow us to understand the effective use of RFAs’ resources.  
For this purpose, we gathered financial statement information of the following RFAs from their annual 
reports: AMF, EFSD, EFSF and ESM, and FLAR. Once again, the IMF 7  is used as a reference for 
comparison purposes. BRICS CRA, CMIM, NAFA, EFSM, and EU BoP Facility are excluded as no balance-
sheet information is available.8 For consistency, we use end-year 2016 as a cut-off date for all financial 
statement data.9 To facilitate comparison, we also harmonised and simplified the balance sheet items. 
On the asset side, we are mainly interested in the relative size of assistance programmes and that of 
asset investment (including cash holding and other investment). On the liability side, we focus on the 
size of capital10/financial contribution brought in by member states and any other funding sources 
(e.g., market borrowing, deposits, etc.). Capital also includes retained earnings or reserves.  
Figure 4 presents the simplified balance sheets of the selected RFAs, which confirm our classification 
of RFAs above based on the reading of RFAs’ legal documents: there are RFAs that solely rely on market 
funding or members’ contributions while others adopt a mixed funding strategy. The EFSF – also by 
definition – is the most leveraged RFA. The resources for assistance come exclusively from market 
borrowing. This is also the case for the ESM. Even if almost half of ESM’s total liabilities are paid-in 
capital, the capital cannot be used to provide assistance programmes and is entirely invested in highly 
secured securities (explaining the high ratio of investment of 57% in the ESM’s balance sheet). AMF 
and FLAR have both deposits and member states’ paid-in capital as liabilities. Most of them are re-
invested in trading securities or held as cash as of end 2016. EFSD also has exclusively used its capital 
to provide assistance programmes so far.  
 
 
                                                          
7 For the IMF, we distinguish the General Resources Account from its Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust-related accounts, 
as they have very different financial features.   
8 The first three RFAs in this group are fully funded by member states’ contributions and do not publish financial statements. 
The two other European RFAs are administered by the European Commission on a “need-to-fund” basis with the EU budget 
as guarantees, therefore standard balance-sheet information is not available. 
9 Due to its financial reporting cycle, the IMF’s financial statement information is as of end January 2017.   
10 Capital also includes retained earnings or reserves, wherever relevant.  
Legal maximum 
lending capacity
Subscribed capital/
Commitments Paid-in
Sum of maximum 
access rights
Harmmonised 
statutory lending 
capacity
ESM 550.0 775.3 88.6 - 550.0
EFSF* 484.0 798.6 - - 484.0
EU BoP 55.0 - - - 55.0
EFSM 66.0 - - - 66.0
AMF** 12.0 4.1 3.7 6.9 12.0
FLAR 4.9 3.9 3.0 6.6 4.9
EFSD - 8.5 3.1 8.5 8.5
BRICS - 100.0 - 84.5 100.0
CMIM
- 240.0 - 243.5 240.0
Contributions 
only
Market financing
RFA
Mixed strategy
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Figure 4 Simplified balance sheet of selected RFAs (as of end 2016) 
         AMF                           EFSD 
 
          EFSF                             ESM 
 
         FLAR 
 
 
 
Source: RFAs’ annual reports and the authors’ calculation. 
 
Figure 5 presents the simplified balance sheets of the IMF’s General Resources Account (GRA) and 
accounts related to poverty reduction (Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust – PRGT). We observe that 
the IMF also primarily rely on member states’ contribution – quotas – to provide assistance. As the 
IMF functions as an intermediary between creditor countries (countries with a strong external 
position, defined every quarter by the so-called Financial Transaction Plan) and programme countries, 
most of quotas are held as cash (usable currencies) included in the entry “investment”. The accounts 
related to poverty reduction function differently as the IMF borrows from selected creditor countries, 
which provide subsidies for concessional lending channelled by the IMF to borrowing countries. 
Investment 79% Deposits 63%
Assistance 19% Other liabilities 5%
Other assets 2% Capital 32%
Total 100% Total 100%
Assets Liabilities
Total Nominal AAD 3744 million
Investment 23% Other l iabilities 0.1%
Assistance 77% Capital 99.9%
Total 100% Total 100%
Assets Liabilities
Total Nominal USD 3504 million
Investment 89.5% Deposits 53.8%
Assistance 10.5% Capital 46.2%
Total 100% Total 100%
Assets Liabilities
Total Nominal USD 6801 million
Investment 3% Mkt borrowing 98.9%
Other l iabilities 0.7%
Assistance 97% Capital 0.4%
Total 100% Total 100%
EUR 188244 millionTotal Nominal
Assets Liabilities
Investment 57% Mkt borrowing 51.1%
Assistance 43% Capital 48.9%
Total 100% Total 100%
Assets Liabilities
Total Nominal EUR 168576 million
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However, both cases – GRA and PRGT, the IMF can only borrow from its member states11 and market 
borrowing is not permitted.  
 
 
 
 
   Figure 5 Simplified balance sheet of the IMF 
Source: IMF financial statements and own calculation. 
When we compare different RFAs together with the IMF, one can see that the share of financial 
assistance compared to the total size of the balance sheet is highest for EFSF (97%), EFSD (77%) and 
ESM (43%) as of end 2016. Figure 6 further provides a graphical representation of RFAs’ outstanding 
loans as of December 2016 relative to their pseudo statutory lending capacity as defined in Table 1. 
Apart from the EFSM, all other RFAs still have more than 50% of their balance sheet unused.  
Figure 6 Current outstanding loans vs. maximum lending capacity 
                                                          
11 Under GRA, the IMF can borrow from selected members under the New Arrangement to Borrow and bilateral borrowing 
arrangements (as a second line of defence) or General Arrangement to Borrow (third line of defence). 
IMF General Resources Account IMF Accounts Related to Poverty Reduction
Investment 90.5% Borrowing 6%
Assistance 9.3%
Other assets 0.2% Capital 94%
Total 100% Total 100%
Assets Liabilities
Total Nominal SDR 527497 million
Investment 56.9% Borrowing 47%
Assistance 43.1% Capital 53%
Total 100% Total 100%
Total Nominal SDR 14796 million
Assets Liabilities
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Source: RFAs’ annual reports and the authors’ calculation. NB. EFSF is not allowed to finance additional programmes. 
2.3 Reflections on the relationship between RFAs’ financial structures and their lending 
capacity 
Based on the balance sheet information, together with the legal documents of different RFAs, we 
observe diverse funding strategies among RFAs, which are also directly related to the institutions’ 
lending capacity. The funding strategies vary from one end of the spectrum, member states’ 
contributions only, to the other, market financing backed by a properly designed capital or guarantee 
structure. Why and how do the institutions choose among different financial structures? What are the 
pros and cons for own funding and market financing respectively? We offer below some reflections 
on the trade-offs between different financial structures.  
2.3.1 Member states’ contributions 
Using member states’ own contributions is the safest way to insure sustained resources for an RFA’s 
core function. There is no uncertainty about their maximum lending capacity. The contributions are, 
in most cases, determined by unanimity among member states even before the institutions are up 
and running. And in any case, RFAs’ legal documents often also have provisions about how to increase 
initial contributions in the face of rising need for assistance. During the Global Financial Crisis for 
instance, a number of RFAs, including AMF, CMIM, FLAR, significantly increased their initial capital or 
contributions.  
Regarding the downside of this funding strategy, the IMF comes in as a good illustration. A rich political 
economy literature on IMF lending points to the influence of the US – the biggest single-country 
shareholder and financial contributor – on the lending decision and conditions for the borrowing 
484
550
66
8.513
55
6.9 4.8
240
100
9 0
100
200
300
400
500
600
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
EFSF ESM EFSM EFSD EU BoPF AMF FLAR CMIM BRICS CRA NAFA
Share of used resources Share of remaining resources Nominal amount (RHS)
Billion USD
  
  
 
14 
 
country.12 Similarly, even if having some big shareholders as permanent creditors can enhance the 
stability and credibility of an RFA, big member states may also have different economic principles and 
ideology from small members and influence the latter through their weight in deciding for an 
assistance programme. In addition, relying exclusively on paid-in capital to finance financial assistance 
necessarily misses the opportunity to leverage on private and market resources, which are often 
ampler and more flexible to mobilise in the face of a large shock.   
2.3.2 Market financing 
Allowing RFAs to leverage on market financing is a way to secure private-sector contributions. This 
helps to raise a large amount of funds with only limited paid-in capital. However, this strategy exposes 
an RFA to financial cycles and market volatilities. The financial environment in the past few years with 
low interest rates globally were favourable for this funding strategy. There could be more challenges 
in the future when interest rates normalise as by their mandate RFAs need to provide their member 
states with facilities at low cost.  
Therefore, RFAs adopting a market funding strategy – especially those which solely rely on it – needs 
to have a very strong capital or guarantee structure. In addition, to sustain low-cost financing from 
markets to beneficiary members, RFAs need to carefully design their funding plan, decide when and 
with which instruments to avoid competition with peer supranational issuers for instance. In addition, 
RFAs can also consider entering into interest rate swaps with other financial institutions to lock cheap 
financing. For instance, as part of the EFSF/ESM funding strategy to reduce interest rate risks for 
Greece, the ESM swapped floating for fixed interest rate cash flows with some counterparties so that 
Greece could have more certainty and predictability on the future stream of interest rates it must pay.  
In addition, credit rating agencies will also scrutiny these institutions’ governance, portfolios and 
management in order to assign proper ratings. To secure and maintain top-notch creditworthiness is 
key to ensure low funding costs. In what follows, we will describe and analyse the methodologies used 
by credit rating agencies to assign ratings to supranational institutions. This exercise – against the 
background of our understanding of RFAs’ governance structure – will help us understand the market 
perspective of RFAs’ creditworthiness and lending capacity.  
Please note that although a purely market-based financing with member states’ contributions as a 
guarantee or capital structure may be rare among RFAs, it is a common financial structure adopted by 
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). Therefore, how to reconcile the need to maintain the highest 
credit ratings while providing financial assistance to member states – often the less developed ones 
that may also be considered as riskier – is an issue of common interest among a number of 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs).  
                                                          
12 For the literature on this topic, please refer to Oatley and Yackee (2004), Dreher et al. (2009), and Copelovitch (2010). 
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3 RFAS’ LENDING CAPACITY FROM A CREDIT RATING PERSPECTIVE  
In Section 2, we documented the financial structure and lending capacity of different RFAs from both 
a statutory and accounting perspective. We learned that some RFAs purely rely on their member 
states’ financial contributions while others are allowed to tap financial markets to support their 
lending operations. In this section, we will scrutinise RFAs’ lending capacities from a market 
perspective. For this, we turn to the credit rating agencies’ methodologies on supranational entities 
and MDBs to infer the leverage capacity and creditworthiness of RFAs. Here, we will mainly focus on 
RFAs that are legally allowed to raise funds from financial markets, e.g., AMF, the European RFAs, and 
FLAR, plus EFSD. 
In what follows, we will first compare the actual lending capacity of RFAs with a counterfactual lending 
capacity based on a leverage factor, which builds either on RFAs’ paid-in or callable capital. Second, 
we will approximate a credit rating for the RFAs based on the credit strength of their respective 
shareholders, which should be seen as a minimum, or floor rating, as it ignores possible intrinsic factor 
strengths. Finally, using a stylised model, we provide some reflections on the interaction between 
RFAs’ capital structure, lending capacity, and member states’ creditworthiness and support.  
3.1 An assessment of RFAs’ lending capacity from the rating agencies’ perspective 
Credit rating agencies assess RFAs’ lending capacity in the context of their ability and willingness to 
honour their debt in full and on time. They use quantitative metrics and qualitative factors to inform 
the decision of a Rating Committee, which determines the final rating. Overall, their analytical 
approach combines the assessment of the entities’ intrinsic strengths and the strength of the support 
they obtain from their shareholders. In what follows, we abstract from the qualitative judgements, 
which are unobservable ex ante, and instead focus exclusively on the quantitative credit metrics cited 
in the agencies’ methodologies. The relevant metrics, our assumptions and results are explained 
below.  
3.1.1 Methodology and assumptions 
In a nutshell, the three US credit rating agencies – Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch – estimate 
the RFAs’ lending capacity by relating their paid-in or callable capital either to their risk-weighted 
assets (financial assistance programmes) or market debt, although exact ratios differ across agencies.   
With regard to the paid-in capital metrics, the supranational methodology used by Moody’s (2016) 
provides two metrics that we can use to estimate and assess the RFAs’ maximum lending capacity, 
namely, its asset coverage and leverage ratios. 
First, the Asset Coverage Ratio compares the entity’s usable equity (total shareholders’ equity 
excluding callable capital) to the assets that can incur losses. For the ESM, Moody’s includes the risk-
weighted paid-in capital13 in the numerator and all programme loans and possible equity operations 
in the denominator. For simplicity and for comparison across institutions, we will use unweighted 
RFAs’ paid-in capital14  in the numerator and the outstanding loans of financial assistance in the 
                                                          
13 The usable equity or paid-in capital is risk-weighted by the five-year expected loss associated with their rating. 
14 Otherwise, we would have to make assumptions about the investment strategies of the RFAs, and in any case, applied risk-
weights only marginally affect this metric. For instance, investing € 20bn in Aa3 as opposed to Aa2 rated assets, increases 
the risk-weights to € 16mn from € 7mn. 
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denominator. Second, the Leverage Ratio is measured by dividing an entity’s market debt by its equity, 
i.e., paid-in capital in our analysis. Then, Moody’s maps both ratios into a five-point scale from “Very 
High” to “Very Low” quality as shown below: 
 
 
Source: Moody’s 
Similarly, Fitch (2018) uses the Capital Ratio, which compares an entity’s shareholder’s equity (i.e. 
RFAs’ paid-in capital) with its assets net of the fair value of derivative instruments recorded on balance 
sheet (i.e., financial assistance programmes). This metric is used as part of Fitch’s intrinsic strength 
assessment. Fitch’s four-point scale is provided below: 
Source: Fitch 
Finally, according to S&P’s (2017) Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio (RAC) assesses the extent to which 
capital and earnings would cover losses by comparing an entity’s capital (i.e., paid-in capital and 
earnings) to its risk-weighted assets (i.e., programme loans). S&P’s seven-point scale is provided 
below: 
Source: S&P 
With regard to the callable capital metrics, Moody’s uses its Contractual Support assessment, which 
divides an entity’s outstanding debt by the discounted callable capital of its investment-grade rated 
shareholders only, computed as the product of the callable capital amount and the idealised expected 
loss at a 30-year horizon. The table below gives the range of Moody’s Contractual Support: 
  
Source: Moody’s 
Fitch’s assessment of the strength of shareholder support calculates the rating of callable capital 
covering net debt. This refers to the rating of the lowest-rated shareholder whose callable capital, 
when added to that of the higher-rated shareholders, ensures full coverage of outstanding net debt, 
defined as outstanding debt minus liquid assets rated AA- or above.  
S&P assesses the likelihood of extraordinary shareholder support, by adjusting the abovementioned 
RAC ratio by adding to the numerator the callable capital from all shareholders that have foreign 
Very High High Very Low
> 50% 25% < X < 50% < 5%
Medium
10% < X < 25%
Low
5% < X < 10%
Moody's Asset Coverage Ratio
Very High High Very Low
0% < X < 150% 150% < X < 300% > 800%
Medium
300% < X < 500%
Low
500% < X < 800%
Moody's Leverage Ratio
> 25%
Excellent
15% to 25%
Strong
8% to 15%
Moderate
< 8%
Weak
Fitch's Capital Ratio
> 23% 15% - 23% 10% - 15% 7% - 10% 5% - 7% 3% - 5% < 3%
Extremely Strong Very Strong Strong Adequate Moderate Weak Very Weak
S&P's Risk Adjusted Capital Ratio
Very High High Very Low
0% < X < 150% 150% < X < 300% > 1000%
Medium
300% < X < 600%
Low
600% < X < 1000%
Moody's Contractual Support
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currency ratings equal to or higher than the issuer credit rating of the entity. This reflects the positive 
impact of the callable capital on the entity’s creditworthiness.  
In sum, as detailed in each of the three agencies’ methodologies, for comparison across different 
institutions and given the slightly different definitions for the credit metrics, we have to take some 
simplifying assumptions. Specifically, our main assumption is to equate a RFA’s total financial 
assistance with its ‘assets that can incur losses’ (Moody’s), ‘outstanding debt’ (Moody’s), ‘assets 
adjusted for the net fair value of derivative instruments’ (Fitch) and ‘risk-weighted assets’ (S&P). 
Similarly, we equate a RFA’s paid-in capital with its ‘usable equity’ or ‘capital’. We also ignore possible 
adjustments for Preferred Creditor Treatment and diversification/concentration.  
3.1.2 Results  
Based on these metrics and our abovementioned simplifying assumptions, we can estimate the RFAs’ 
maximum lending capacity commensurate with the highest assessments by the rating agencies. Table 
2 summarizes our results for each RFA for all possible approaches. Overall, these results need to be 
interpreted with maximum caution given that rating agencies base their assessments on a 
combination of several quantitative and qualitative factors, as opposed to one variable as depicted in 
this exercise.  However, these metrics show clearly the link and hypothetical size of the maximum 
lending capacity of RFAs financing themselves on the market for a given rating level.  
The estimates based on paid-in capital ratios are only useful for the ESM, FLAR, AMF and EFSD. Using 
the rating agencies’ metrics, and applying the leverage factors consistent with the strongest credit 
assessments, results in a lending capacity ranging between $147 billion and $653.5 billion (Table 2, 
upper panel, last two columns). This compares to an actual total paid-in capital of $98 billion from the 
above-mentioned four RFAs (Table 2, upper panel, column 4). We note that the pseudo statutory limit 
above $1.5 trillion necessarily points to the need to assess the maximum lending capacity of RFAs not 
just based on paid-in but also callable capital. 
In fact, the callable capital metrics point to much greater lending capacities, reflecting the fact that 
callable capital rated AA- or above amounts to around $827.6 billion for our selected sample of RFAs. 
Notably, callable capital rated BBB- or above exceeds $1 trillion (Table 2, lower panel, columns 5 and 
6). Again, this compares to $98 billion of paid-in capital. As a result, lending capacities based on these 
metrics are much larger. For instance, using Moody’s metrics for assessing the strength of “contractual 
support”, which relies on investment-grade rated callable capital only, shows that a 1.5 leverage 
factor, resulting in a combined total lending capacity of around $1.9 trillion would still be assessed as 
“Very High”.  The “High” assessment, which is consistent with a 3.0 leverage factor would result in a 
doubling of the maximum lending capacity of around $3.8 trillion. The metrics of Fitch and S&P also 
point to the link between the quality of callable capital and the lending capacity.  For instance, based 
on S&P’s metrics, if all RFAs were to be rated at AA-, and thus callable capital rated at AA- or above 
were to be included in the RAC calculation, the combined maximum lending capacity of above $4 
trillion would still be assessed as ‘extremely strong’. The lower the rating, the higher the lending 
capacity. If all RFAs were to be rated at BBB-, the lending capacity would increase to around $9 trillion. 
However, it is unclear, if not unlikely, that a lower-rated RFA would be able to act as a stabilizing force 
during times of crises, and in addition, fund itself on favourable conditions in a sustainable way.  
Table 2 Estimates for RFAs’ Maximum Lending Capacity (based on Paid-in and Callable Capital Metrics of Rating Agencies’ Supranational Methodologies) 
 
 
 
 
 
NB. Moody’s contractual support relies on investment-grade rated callable capital only. S&P’s risk adjusted capital ratio for support includes callable capital based on an entity’s rating (we 
assume AA- and BBB- for simplicity).  We assume EFSF guarantees only (not over-guarantees). 
Source: Moody’s, Fitch, S&P, RFAs, own calculations.  
> 50% 25% < X < 50% 0% < X < 150% 150% < X < 300% 15% to 25%
Very High High Very High High Strong
ESM 550.0 177.2 354.4 132.9 265.8 590.7 132.9 590.7
EFSF* 484.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
EU BoP 55.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
EFSM 66.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
AMF** 12.0 7.0 14.0 5.3 10.5 23.3 5.3 23.3
FLAR 4.8 5.7 11.4 4.3 8.6 19.1 4.3 19.1
EFSD 8.5 6.1 12.2 4.6 9.2 20.4 4.6 20.4
BRICS 100.0
CMIM 240.0
NAFA 9.0
Total 196.0 392.1 147.0 294.1 653.5 147.0 653.5
15.2
13.3
426.2
Very Strong
385.2
0.0
--
--
23.3
20.4
653.5
590.7
0.0
12.4 19.1
88.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
Estimated Range
Min Max
Maximum Lending Capacity 
Estimates based on Paid-in Capital (USD bn)
Market 
financing only
RFA Type
Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio
S&P
Asset Coverage Ratio Leverage Ratio
Moody's
Capitalisation Ratio
Fitch
Excellent
> 25%Pseudo statutory lending capacity
0.0
0.0
1,529.3 98.0
--
2.9 11.4
Paid-in Capital > 23%Extremely Strong
15% - 23%
354.4
0.0
--
0.0
Members' 
Contributions 
Only
Mixed funding 
strategy
--
--
14.0
12.2
392.1
3.5
3.1
> 23% 15% - 23% > 23% 15% - 23%
Total Rated ≥ AA- Rated ≥ BBB- Extremely Strong Very Strong Extremely Strong Very Strong
ESM 550.0 686.7 419.8 649.0 AA+ 508.4 737.6 2,210.5 3,389.5 3,207.0 4,917.4 542.7 508.4 4,917.4
EFSF* 484.0 484.0 319.7 484.0 AA 319.7 484.0 1,390.1 2,131.5 2,104.3 3,226.7 338.8 319.7 3,226.7
EU BoP 55.0 65.9 44.0 63.8 AAA 44.0 63.8 191.2 293.2 277.6 425.6 46.1 44.0 425.6
EFSM 66.0 65.9 44.0 63.8 AAA 44.0 63.8 191.2 293.2 277.6 425.6 46.1 44.0 425.6
AMF** 12.0 0.6 0.1 0.2 -- 3.7 3.8 15.7 24.1 16.2 24.9 2.9 0.3 24.9
FLAR 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 3.7 3.8 12.4 19.1 12.4 19.1 2.0 0.0 19.1
EFSD 8.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 BBB 0.8 1.8 13.3 20.4 13.3 20.4 2.1 0.0 20.4
BRICS 100.0 100.0
CMIM 240.0 240.0
NAFA 9.0 0.0
Total 1,529.3 1,643.0 827.6 1,260.9 924.3 1,358.7 4,024.5 5,908.5 9,059.6 980.7 924.3 9,059.6
Estimated Range
Min Max
Mixed funding 
strategy
0.0
Fitch
Callable Capital Net Debt Coverage
Assuming Rating AA- Assuming Rating BBB-Callable Capital 0% < X < 150% 150% < X < 300% Latest Average 
Rating*
Capacity Assuming 
Rating AA-
Maximum Lending Capacity
Estimates based on Callable Capital (USD bn)
S&P
Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio
95.8 191.5
95.8 191.5
Capacity Assuming 
Rating BBB-
0.0
RFA Pseudo statutory lending capacity
Moody's
Contractual Support 70% 
Subscribed 
Capital
4.3 6.7
0.0
0.7
973.5 1,947.0
1,452.0726.0
0.3
Very High High
0.0
Leverage Factor 1.5 3.0
1,891.4 3,782.8
Members' 
Contributions 
Only
Market 
financing only
3.2 RFAs’ creditworthiness based on the support from their member states 
The previous section provided a simplified framework for estimating the maximum lending capacity 
of RFAs. It also showed the clear link in the agencies’ assessment between an institution’s lending 
capacity, its shareholder strength, capital structure and its own creditworthiness. In this section, we 
will highlight that RFAs can benefit from several institutional aspects that can enhance their 
creditworthiness in order to ensure a higher maximum lending capacity while preserving a high-quality 
rating.  
3.2.1 Methodology and assumptions 
As explained earlier, while the details of the agencies’ rating approaches can differ, they generally 
assess a supranational institution’s creditworthiness based on two main elements: (1) the intrinsic 
strength, which is related to the capital and liquidity metrics as well as the management of the 
institutions, and (2) its member states’ support, in the form of a capital structure or guarantee scheme. 
Of course, on top of this quantitative assessment, there is also room for qualitative judgements by the 
Rating Committees. Once again, we subtract the judgements from our exercise. 
As assessing RFAs’ intrinsic strength would require extensive financial statement data that are in many 
cases not publicly available, we base our rating estimate on the support from the RFAs’ member states 
only, which depends on two things: the allocation key used to determine each member state’s 
contribution to an RFA and the ratings of all shareholders. For reference, the elements considered in 
the intrinsic assessment include, but are not limited to, the asset quality and portfolio diversification, 
risk management, liquidity and treasury policies, profitability, the operating environment, and 
governance-related issues. In this context we note that our support assessment can be considered as 
providing a floor rating for a supranational institution while the intrinsic strength gives additional 
uplift15. 
We approximate the rating for each RFA based on the Average Key Shareholder from Fitch and the 
Median Shareholder Rating from Moody’s. Fitch (2018) uses the metric of Average Key Shareholder to 
assess an entity’s capacity to provide support in case it does not have callable capital. This metric is 
based on the adjusted capital-key weighted rating of the largest shareholders whose cumulative total 
capital contribution exceeds 50%. Moody’s (2016) uses a similar metric – Median Shareholder Rating 
– to assess an entity’s extraordinary support, which refers to the capital-key-weighted median 
shareholder rating.  
3.2.2 Results 
As explained above, our approach to estimate a RFA’s creditworthiness is purely based on shareholder 
support, and thus provides a lower-bound estimate. This is also confirmed when we compare our 
derived ratings (Figure 7, orange and grey lines) with the actual ratings (Figure 7, green lines) for the 
EFSD, EFSF, ESM, and FLAR. We also provide information on the support rating for AMF, BRICS CRA 
and CMIM even though they are not rated by any agencies and further, both BRICS CRA and CMIM are 
not allowed to tap financial markets at the current state. For this second group of RFAs, the 
information provided below serves merely as a counterfactual analysis.  
                                                          
15 To date the US rating agencies usually start with a fundamental assessment and then provide an uplift based on their 
assessment of the strength of the shareholder support. The approach of other agencies also includes determining two 
distinct ratings and choosing the higher of the two.  
Figure 7 Proxy-Ratings based on Shareholder Support 
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 Source: Own calculations based on the average of the actual ratings of Moody’s, Fitch and S&P for each RFA’s shareholder. 
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From this analysis, we confirm that formal arrangements or institutions which go beyond guarantees 
and credit lines and consequently have their own paid-in capital, conservative investment and 
liquidity practices, are perceived to be stronger RFAs compared to the ones relying exclusively on 
shareholder support. This was one of the key lessons from the European crisis. 
FLAR’s case merits our particular attention. We observe that its actual rating is several notches higher 
than any support rating from its members (the same applies to EFSD but to a lesser extent). This 
difference must be attributed to intrinsic factors or qualitative judgements by the agencies on its 
institutional aspects. In particular, this RFA has a perfect repayment history; none of its members ever 
defaulted on FLAR’s assistance, in part because FLAR programmes are of limited size and have 
relatively short maturities. In addition, FLAR’s maximum lending capacity must not exceed 65% of its 
paid-in capital, minimizing any potential risk to investors. When a serious crisis hits a member state, 
FLAR is expected to provide a “bridge financing” while waiting for the IMF to provide an envelope of 
larger amount and a fully-developed programme. Cheng et al. (2018) provide empirical evidence on 
this type of financing provided by FLAR.  
3.3 The interaction between RFAs’ capital structure, creditworthiness and lending 
capacity 
The examination of credit rating agencies shows a dynamic relationship between the creditworthiness 
and lending capacity of an RFA, the credit quality of its shareholders, the member states’ financial 
support and their relative weight in the total financial contributions. On the one hand, the higher the 
paid-in capital – which represents a direct transfer from the member states to an RFA – the larger the 
borrowing capacity of an RFA, and thus the higher its financial assistance capacity. On the other hand, 
the larger the callable capital, especially when it is associated with the highest rated member states, 
the higher member states’ support is perceived by the markets, the higher the creditworthiness the 
RFA possesses.  
We develop a stylised model below to illustrate this dynamic relationship and to reflect on the key 
governance decisions an RFA needs to consider should it envisage market financing.  
In this stylised model, let us assume that there are only two member states – 1 and 2 – for a model 
RFA, with the respective key of financial contribution of 𝜂1 and 𝜂2. By definition, 𝜂1 + 𝜂2 = 1. It is also 
of common understanding that contribution keys are exogenously determined by some fundamental 
variables, e.g., GDP and population, over which institutions rarely have a control.   
We denote the total subscribed capital or financial contribution of the model RFA “SK”, which is 
composed of a paid-in part “PK” and a callable part “CK”. As a standard practice, the paid-in capital 
can be expressed as a ratio of the total subscribed capital, which we denote “𝜙”, namely, 𝑃𝐾 = 𝜙𝑆𝐾. 𝜙 is normally defined by the governance of an RFA in its founding legal documents and can be changed 
according to its decision-making procedure. We can thus write the following equations for our model 
RFA: 𝑆𝐾 = 𝑆𝐾1 + 𝑆𝐾2 = 𝜂1𝑆𝐾 +  𝜂2𝑆𝐾 𝑃𝐾 = 𝜙𝑆𝐾 = 𝜙𝜂1𝑆𝐾 +  𝜙𝜂2𝑆𝐾 𝐶𝐾 = (1 − 𝜙)𝑆𝐾 = (1 − 𝜙)𝜂1𝑆𝐾 +  (1 − 𝜙)𝜂2𝑆𝐾 
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We further assume that the model RFA can tap financial markets and can leverage on its paid-in capital 
and the potential support from the callable capital, in line with the methodology described in Section 
3.1.1. The support from the callable capital depends on the creditworthiness of its member states 
providing it. Only the support from a member state whose creditworthiness is recognised by the 
markets with a strong rating is considered based on the current practice of the major rating agencies. 
For simplicity, we also assume that the maximum lending capacity is a linear function of the sum of 
the paid-in capital and the eligible callable capital. This leads to the following definition of the 
maximum lending capacity of an RFA (denoted “MaxLC”), which can be understood as if the RFA had 
its whole balance sheet available for financial assistance: MaxLC = (1 + β)(∑ 𝐶𝐾i + PK) , where ∑ 𝐶𝐾i  denotes the part of callable capital considered as credit enhancement (i.e., from country i with 
sufficiently high credit rating).  
We then consider the following three scenarios. (1) When both member states have sufficiently high 
credit rating, rating agencies will consider both the paid-in capital and the callable capital from the 
member states to assess the creditworthiness of the model RFA. (2) When only one of the two 
member states has sufficiently high credit rating, only the callable capital from the high-creditworthy 
member state will enhance the RFA’s rating in addition to the paid-in capital. (3) When neither of both 
member states has sufficiently credit rating, rating agencies will ignore the support from callable 
capital, and only consider the paid-in capital in the creditworthiness of the model RFA. We express the 
maximum lending capacity in a function of the subscribed capital in these three scenarios as follows:  
 Scenario 1: both member states have sufficiently high credit rating: 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐿𝐶1 = ∑ 𝐶𝐾𝑖 + 𝑃𝐾 = 𝐶𝐾1 + 𝐶𝐾2 + 𝑃𝐾 = (𝜂1 + 𝜂2)𝑆𝐾 = 𝑆𝐾𝑖  
 Scenario 2: only member state 1 has sufficiently high credit rating: 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐿𝐶2 = ∑ 𝐶𝐾𝑖 + 𝑃𝐾 = 𝐶𝐾1 + 𝑃𝐾 = (𝜂1 + 𝜙𝜂2)𝑆𝐾 = [𝜂1 + (1 − 𝜂1)𝜙]𝑆𝐾𝑖  
 Scenario 3: none of the two member states have sufficiently high credit rating: 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐿𝐶3 = ∑ 𝐶𝐾𝑖 + 𝑃𝐾 = 0 + 𝑃𝐾 = (𝜙𝜂1 + 𝜙𝜂2)𝑆𝐾 = 𝜙𝑆𝐾𝑖  
Figure 8 graphically shows the dynamic relationship between the paid-in capital ratio, relative 
contribution key (of the higher rated member state) and the lending capacity of the model RFA. 
Clearly, when both member states have sufficiently high ratings for the agencies to consider their 
support to the RFA in terms of callable capital, the RFA reaches the highest lending capacity, which is 
expressed as a multiplier to the subscribed capital, regardless of the relative contributions of the two 
member states and the paid-in capital ratio. This is because both paid-in and callable capital are fully 
taken into account to assess the RFA’s creditworthiness. In the opposite extreme scenario (scenario 
3), when none of the member states have the sufficiently high credit rating, increasing the share of 
paid-in capital is the only way to raise the RFA’s lending capacity. This is because paid-in capital is the 
strongest form of member states’ commitment. One can think of the example of FLAR, whose 
members’ average rating is under BBB-. The institution has also a very high paid-in capital ratio 
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(72.5%). Finally, for the intermediate case, the model RFA’s lending capacity is increased by either an 
increase in the share of the contribution from the higher rated member state or the paid-in capital 
ratio from either member state. 
In summary, from a rating agency’s perspective, we can conclude that to maximize the lending 
capacity of an RFA, either member states need to make sure that their own creditworthiness is 
sufficient to provide a firm support to the institution they create, if not, they should pay their 
contributions ex ante to ensure the institution’s creditworthiness. Stated differently, for a RFA to be 
credible from a credit and thus funding perspective and thus sever as a stabiliser in the region, it must 
benefit from either member states contributing a large share to the RFA’s capital or guarantee 
structure having very strong creditworthiness and/ or significant amounts of paid-in capital.  
 
Figure 8 Dynamic relationship between paid-in capital ratio, capital keys and lending capacity 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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4 CONCLUSION 
This paper provided a detailed account of the financial structures and lending capacity of different 
RFAs. In particular, it offers a comprehensive review of the issue, from statutory, accounting and credit 
and rating perspectives. 
We believe our work provides useful insight for a range of readers and avenues for future analysis. 
From a policy perspective, our work illustrates the heterogeneity of RFAs and confirms that RFAs vary 
in terms of their financial structures and maximum lending capacity. Future work could aim to uncover 
the diversity of this group of institutions from other aspects, e.g. their assistance toolkit, conditionality 
and existing working relations with the IMF, etc. Second, from an institutional perspective, we 
illustrate the dynamic relations between an institution’s lending capacity, its capital structure 
(especially, in terms of the relative size of paid-in and callable capital), and the credit support from the 
member states and the member states’ own creditworthiness. Our assessment based on credit rating 
agencies’ methodologies provides a counterfactual floor rating for selective RFAs. This suggests that 
for RFAs that are allowed to tap financial markets, they could further enhance their creditworthiness 
by “getting the house in order” to enhance the intrinsic strength. FLAR provides an excellent example 
with this regard. In addition, for RFAs that are not (regular) market issuers yet, they could take this 
dynamic relationship into account when deciding to borrow from the markets one day. For any new 
institutions that could be created in the future, our stylised model could provide useful thoughts on 
how to best split the paid-in and callable capital. In the future, we can also try to enrich our stylised 
model with the application of the trade-off theory of capital structure (Modigliani and Miller, 1958 
and Miller, 1977) in RFAs’ institutional context.  Finally, from the rating perspective, one can easily see 
that different metrics and methodologies used by different agencies lead to a large range of 
approximated lending capacity of a giving institution. Sometimes, the prevailing methodologies also 
fail to capture some specific features of these regional crisis funds. How to further improve the 
methodology to rate supranational agencies and whether agencies should fine-tune their 
methodologies to distinguish crisis resolution mechanisms from development banks are relevant 
questions for rating agencies to explore.  
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ANNEX – RFAS’ FINANCIAL STRUCTURES 
We present below RFAs’ financial structures as described in their legal documentation. 
 
Arab Monetary Fund 
 
 
BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Authorised and subscribed 
capital Shares paid-in (total) Basic vote Contribution adjusted vote Voting weight
Million AAD Unit Million AAD Unit Unit %
Jordan 14.85 297 13.86 75 372 1.89%
UAE 52.95 1059 49.42 75 1134 5.77%
Bahrain 13.8 276 12.88 75 351 1.79%
Tunisia 19.275 385.5 17.99 75 461 2.34%
Algeria 116.85 2337 109.06 75 2412 12.27%
Saudi Arabia 133.425 2668.5 124.53 75 2744 13.96%
Sudan 27.6 552 23.00 75 627 3.19%
Syria 19.875 397.5 16.56 75 473 2.40%
Somalia 11.025 220.5 9.19 75 296 1.50%
Iraq 116.85 2337 109.06 75 2412 12.27%
Oman 13.8 276 12.88 75 351 1.79%
Qatar 27.6 552 25.76 75 627 3.19%
Kuwait 88.2 1764 82.32 75 1839 9.36%
Lebanon 13.8 276 12.88 75 351 1.79%
Lybia 37.035 740.7 34.57 75 816 4.15%
Egypt 88.2 1764 82.32 75 1839 9.36%
Morocco 41.325 826.5 38.57 75 902 4.59%
Mauritania 13.8 276 12.88 75 351 1.79%
Yemen 42.45 849 36.79 75 924 4.70%
Palestine 5.94 118.8 0.00 75 194 0.99%
Djibouti 0.675 13.5 0.56 75 89 0.45%
Comoros 0.675 13.5 0.56 75 89 0.45%
Total 900 18000 825.64 1650.00 19650 100%
In SDR 2700 2476.929
* paid-in capital consists of local currencies, convertible currencies (second largest) and transfer from general reseserve (largest)
* Arab Accounting Dinars = three times IMF SDR
Contribution Key Access 
multipliers
Max. 
swap 
Basic 
Votes
Votes based on 
contributions
Total Voting 
Power
USD Bn % USD Bn Votes Votes Votes
Brazil 18 18% 1 18 1% 17.10% 18.10%
China 41 41% 0.5 20.5 1% 38.95% 39.95%
India 18 18% 1 18 1% 17.10% 18.10%
Russia 18 18% 1 18 1% 17.10% 18.10%
South Africa 5 5% 2 10 1% 4.75% 5.75%
Total 100 84.5 5% 95% 100%
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Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation 
 
 
 
Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contributions Purchasing 
multiple
Max. 
access
Basic 
Votes
Votes based on 
contributions
(%) (%) USD Bn USD Bn Votes Votes Votes (%)
China
China(Excl. 
Hong Kong)
28.5 68.4 0.5 34.2 3.2 68.4 71.6 25.43
Hong Kong 3.5 8.4 0.75 6.3 0 8.4 8.4 2.98
Japan 32 76.8 0.5 38.4 3.2 76.8 80 28.41
Korea 16 38.4 1 38.4 3.2 38.4 41.6 14.77
Plus 3 80 192 117.3 9.6 192 201.6 71.59
Indonesia 3.793 9.104 2.5 22.76 3.2 9.104 12.304 4.37
Thailand 3.793 9.104 2.5 22.76 3.2 9.104 12.304 4.37
Malaysia 3.793 9.104 2.5 22.76 3.2 9.104 12.304 4.37
Singapore 3.793 9.104 2.5 22.76 3.2 9.104 12.304 4.37
Philippines 3.793 9.104 2.5 22.76 3.2 9.104 12.304 4.37
Vietnam 0.833 2.000 5 10.00 3.2 2.000 5.200 1.85
Cambodia 0.100 0.24 5 1.20 3.2 0.24 3.44 1.22
Myanmar 0.050 0.12 5 0.60 3.2 0.12 3.32 1.18
Brunei 0.025 0.06 5 0.30 3.2 0.06 3.26 1.16
Lao PDR 0.025 0.06 5 0.30 3.2 0.06 3.26 1.16
ASEAN 20 48 126 32 48 80.0 28.41
Total 100 240 243.5 41.6 240 281.60 100.00
32
Voting Power
Total Voting PowerMembers
Contribution
Key
Access right
Subscribed capital Votes Voting power Paid-in capital Country access limits Country access limits
USD Million % USD Million % USD Million
Armenia 1 10 0.01% 1 13% 1106.7
Belarus 10 100 0.12% 2 21% 1787.7
Kazakhstan 1000 10000 11.75% 496.785 24% 2043.1
Kyrgyzstan 1 10 0.01% 0.2 3% 255.4
Russia 7500 75000 88.10% 2558 37% 3149.8
Tajikistan 1 10 0.01% 1 2% 170.3
Total 8513 85130 100% 3058.985 100% 8513
* 10% of paid in in cash (USD or Euros), 90% of paid in in the form of simple, non-convertible, non-interest-bearing bill of exchange 
* Country access limits determined in proportion to GNI per capita
* If needed for the implementation of major projects, a member state may elect to relocate part of its limits to another MS
* One vote = 100000 USD
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European Financial Stability Facility 
 
NB. Greece, Ireland and Portugal stepped out of the guarantee scheme once their respective programmes started. 
 
European Stability Mechanism 
 
Guarantees Key Adjsuted guarantees
Adjusted 
key
EUR bn % EUR bn %
Austria 21.63919 2.7750% 21.63919 2.9869%
Belgium 27.03199 3.4666% 27.03199 3.7313%
Cyprus 1.52568 0.1957% 0.00000 0.0000%
Estonia 1.99486 0.2558% 1.99486 0.2754%
Finland 13.97403 1.7920% 13.97403 1.9289%
France 158.48753 20.3246% 158.48753 21.8762%
Germany 211.04590 27.0647% 211.04590 29.1309%
Greece 21.89774 2.8082% 0.00000 0.0000%
Ireland 12.37815 1.5874% 0.00000 0.0000%
Italy 139.26781 17.8598% 139.26781 19.2233%
Luxembourg 1.94694 0.2497% 1.94694 0.2687%
Malta 0.70433 0.0903% 0.70433 0.0972%
Netherlands 44.44632 5.6998% 44.44632 6.1350%
Portugal 19.50726 2.5016% 0.00000 0.0000%
Slovak Republic 7.72757 0.9910% 7.72757 1.0666%
Slovenia 3.66430 0.4699% 3.66430 0.5058%
Spain 92.54356 11.8679% 92.54356 12.7739%
Total 779.78316 100% 724.47433 100%
Contribution Key Shares Voting power
EUR bn % Unit %
Belgium 24.3397 3.4534% 243397 3.4534%
Germany 190.0248 26.9616% 1900248 26.9616%
Estonia 1.302 0.1847% 13020 0.1847%
Ireland 11.1454 1.5814% 111454 1.5814%
Greece 19.7169 2.7975% 197169 2.7975%
Spain 83.3259 11.8227% 833259 11.8227%
France 142.7013 20.2471% 1427013 20.2471%
Italy 125.3959 17.7917% 1253959 17.7917%
Cyprus 1.3734 0.1949% 13734 0.1949%
Latvia 1.9353 0.2746% 19353 0.2746%
Lithuania 2.8634 0.4063% 28634 0.4063%
Luxembourg 1.7528 0.2487% 17528 0.2487%
Malta 0.5117 0.0726% 5117 0.0726%
Netherlands 40.019 5.6781% 400190 5.6781%
Austria 19.4838 2.7644% 194838 2.7644%
Portugal 17.5644 2.4921% 175644 2.4921%
Slovenia 2.9932 0.4247% 29932 0.4247%
Slovak Republic 5.768 0.8184% 57680 0.8184%
Finland 12.5818 1.7852% 125818 1.7852%
Total 704.7987 7047987 100%
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Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas 
 
 
Subscribed capital Contribution share Paid-in capital Max. multiplier Max. access
USD bn % USD bn USD Bn
Bolivia 0.3281 8.6% 0.2453 2.6 0.64
Colombia 0.6563 17.2% 0.4906 2.5 1.23
Costa Rica 0.6563 14.0% 0.4020 2.5 1.01
Ecuador 0.3281 8.6% 0.2453 2.6 0.64
Paraguay 0.3281 8.6% 0.2449 2.5 0.61
Peru 0.6563 17.2% 0.4906 2.5 1.23
Uruguay 0.3281 8.6% 0.2458 2.5 0.61
Venezuela 0.6563 17.2% 0.4908 2.5 1.23
Total 3.9376 100% 2.8553 7.19
